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Executive Summary 
 
The regulation and communication of risk has changed significantly over the past 20 years 
or so, partially as a result of a number of regulatory scandals in Europe and elsewhere 
(Lofstedt 2004: Majone and Everson 2001; Sunstein 2005), which have led to public distrust 
of regulators and policy makers.   
 
This increase in public distrust has resulted in a phasing-out of consensual-style regulation, 
and the emergence of a newer model of regulation based on variables including public 
participation, transparency, and increasingly powerful non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs).   
 
This paper discusses some of the consequences of adopting this new model of regulation 
through a series of case studies.   
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1. Introduction  
Over the past ten years in many parts of Europe, and in particular in the UK, there have 
been moves away from the old consensual style of regulation to a new model based on 
transparency, public participation and social and environmental values (Lofstedt 2004; UK 
Strategy Unit 2002). The consensual style of regulation was used in the UK as early as1842 
following the passage of the Factory Laws and has the following features (e.g. Ashby and 
Anderson 1981; Brickman et al 1985; Kelman 1981; Lundqvist 1980; Vogel 1986): 
• It was based on consensual styles of regulation in which policy makers and industry met 
behind closed doors and made regulatory decisions; 
• It was elitist in nature, with regulatory decisions made in consultation with a number of 
elite groups including heads of industry, senior regulators, and trade union 
representatives.  These groups were seen as representing society at large.   
 
This model of regulatory decision-making was also inherently flexible.  Regulators made a 
point of addressing potential problems with those being regulated, whether at national and/or 
local level.  The general public generally accepted these arrangements, and even as late as 
1979 for example, only four per cent of British respondents in a survey on the public 
perception of regulators felt that a close collaboration between industry and the regulator 
was improper (Hayward and Berki 1979).  At the same time there was widespread public 
trust of policy makers and regulators throughout Europe.  The public seldom became 
involved in the policy-making process nor was it expected to (Ashby and Anderson 1981). 
 
However,  a number of regulatory scandals that plagued Europe at the end of the 20th 
century, particularly those involving Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), tainted blood 
in France and dioxins in Belgian chickens, lead to increased public distrust of authorities and 
industry (Lofstedt 2004 and 2005). Regulators in many parts of Europe came to the 
conclusion that the consensual style of regulation was flawed, or perhaps even dead 
(Majone and Everson 2001; see also the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy 
2009), and that a new model was needed. This new model, developed  in an ad-hoc and 
very much “muddling-through” fashion and arguably more advanced in some nations (such 
as the UK) than others (such as Sweden) has the following characteristics (European 
Commission 2001; Lofstedt 2004; Royal Commission for Environmental Pollution 1998; UK 
Strategy Unit 2002): 
• It aims to be more inclusive than exclusive, encouraging greater public and stakeholder 
participation in the policy-making process; 
• It calls for regulatory strategies to be completely open and transparent and for regulators 
to be accountable for any policy they propose; and 
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 • The role of science is less important, as scientists are seen as just one of many 
stakeholders. 
  
In an earlier paper one of us highlighted the possible teething problems associated with the 
new model of regulation.  It considered whether regulators were prepared for greater 
transparency, whether public deliberation actually increased public trust in regulatory 
agencies, and whether treating scientists just like any other stakeholder led to better 
decision making (Lofstedt 2004).  Since writing that paper it has become increasingly clear 
to us that not only do these teething problems remain, but that in many cases where the new 
model of regulation has been implemented it has led to unforeseen regulatory 
consequences, referred to within the UK Government as “regulatory storms” (RRAC 2008). 
 
According to the UK Risk and Regulation Advisory Council: 
 
“Regulatory storms are issues that engage the interest of government and attract the 
attention of risk entrepreneurs1, and where a range of parties each act to raise the 
perception of a risk, creating the conditions for government intervention, potentially despite 
any opposing facts.  Regulatory storms typically involve a range of individuals and groups – 
such as experts, special interest groups or the media – each reacting to what the next says 
or does, each potentially increasing the perceived size of the risk, until there is considerable 
pressure on government to act.” 
 
This paper is divided into three sections.  In the first section we will provide evidence of how 
regulators have adopted the new model of regulation.  In the second section we will provide 
a number of cases which portray the unintended regulatory consequences of adopting the 
new regulatory paradigm.  In the final section we offer possible solutions that regulators and 
policy makers may wish to adopt to help better manage these consequences and assist 
them to make better regulatory decisions without necessarily abandoning the new model. 
 
2.  Background 
There is nothing new about the fact that the combined forces of the media, risk 
entrepreneurs and public pressure may influence regulators in making ineffective and often 
unscientific legislation.  Pressure to take knee-jerk regulatory action in the face of uncertainty 
has been observed in many fields over the years ranging from food and animals to 
pharmaceuticals (Bouder 2006; Hood et al 2000; Hood et al 2001).    
   
 
                                            
1 Risk entrepreneurs are organisations whose business or focus is risk.  These include the media, single issue and 
special interest groups, the judiciary, insurance companies, expert commentators, standard setters, academics, 
parliamentarians (notably select committees), and local authorities.  These groups can make positive contributions 
to society by solving very real problems.  However, they may have limited incentives to advocate a measured 
approach to certain risks and some make it their business to conjure up and/or exaggerate risks for reasons such 
as financial gain, attention seeking, power building, job security, and overzealous failure avoidance.  A lack of 
awareness of, and challenge to, their operating practices can allow some to have a deeply unhelpful influence on 
societal-risk perceptions and reactions. 
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 2.1 The new model of regulation 
The new model of regulation, however, goes further. It is a direct result of a fundamental 
rethink of how to develop and enforce regulations that took place in many nations and trade 
blocks after the regulatory scandals noted in section 1 (e.g. European Commission 2001; 
HSE 1999; UK Strategy Unit 2002; Vos 1999).  This new model is further reinforced by 
literature attributing the public as competent, albeit only when politically convenient 
(Fischhoff et al 1982). 
 
All the tools that make up the new model of regulation have more or less one thing in 
common: that of de-facto decreasing the power of regulators and policy makers, while at the 
same time increasing the power of campaigning academics and other stakeholders who are 
supposed to (or claim to) represent the “public” interest.  These risk entrepreneurs have 
either taken or been given power from the existing “old school” regulators and policy makers 
because they are viewed, either by the regulators themselves, the media, or the public (e.g. 
House of Lords 2000), as more trustworthy and honest than the old school.  Indeed the calls 
for transparency by the media and risk entrepreneurs themselves come with the assumed 
observance that in many cases the old school regulators are no longer able to protect the 
public as a result of incompetence or because of a cosy relationship with industry 
(e.g.Grasseley 2007; Lofstedt 2009a and b; Psaty and Ross 2008).   
 
2.2 The increased power of the NGOs 
Hence, in recent years NGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have wielded 
increasing political power. For example, they have delayed the building of nuclear power 
plants in the UK through legal action, halted the offshore dumping of the oil storage buoy 
Brent Spar (even if it was generally  seen as the best environmental option at the time by the 
UK Government (Lofstedt and Renn 1997), and together with certain state actors (such as 
Austria) ensured that genetically modified foods are neither grown commercially nor 
consumed by humans in most of western Europe (Jasanoff 2005).  Such power is 
unprecedented if ones looks back to the old consensual style of regulation when many of the 
non-established risk entrepreneurs were either not allowed to participate or influence the 
regulatory process, or voluntarily chose not to be involved  (Ashby and Anderson 1981; 
Brickman et al 1985; Kelman 1981; Lundqvist 1980; Vogel 1986).   
 
2.3 The role of public participation 
Similarly, there are increasing calls for the public to participate both in policy-making and 
scientific processes (UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE)1999; UK Strategy Unit 2002).  
For a period of six weeks between June and July 2003 for example, the UK Government 
spent £500,000 on a public consultation exercise to determine whether genetically modified 
food should be introduced into the UK.  The exercise, entitled GM Nation?, showed that the 
majority of members of the public participating in the exercise were opposed to the 
introduction of GM foods. However, national public opinion polls showed that the public was 
largely indifferent to GM foods (Hails and Kinderlerer 2003; Horlick-Jones et al 2007; 
Pidgeon et al 2003), highlighting the problems of both self-selection with regard to 
consultation exercises, and arguably a high-jacking of the agenda by risk entrepreneurs (in 
this case a number of anti-GMO NGOs) (Lofstedt 1999 and 2005).    
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 It has also been fashionable to argue for greater public participation in risk governance (van 
Asselt and Rijkens-Klomp 2002).  These calls go back to a 2000 House of Lords report 
which showed that the public had lost trust in science following the BSE scare and there was 
now a need to regain it (House of Lords 2000).  Public understanding of science exercises 
were set up throughout the UK, and academics who had long promoted greater public 
participation in policy making (Irwin 1995; Irwin and Wynne 1996; Jasanoff 1997; Wynne 
1989 and 1996) used the opportunity to further argue for greater citizen participation in 
setting the science agenda (Wilsdon and Willis 2004; Wilsdon et al 2005) on the basis that 
scientists themselves do not always have the public’s best interests at heart (Irwin and 
Michael 2003; Lidskog 2008).   
 
2.4 The role of transparency  
The new model of regulation also calls for greater transparency.  As regulators and policy 
makers are no longer trusted by the public and stakeholders, there is increased pressure to 
ensure that decision-making processes are more open.  Regulators such as the UK Food 
Standards Agency (FSA) for example, have board meetings which are shown live on the 
internet via their websites, and increasingly, scientific evidence submitted to regulators and 
policy makers regarding a particular regulation is immediately put on a publicly-available 
website.  This transparency has empowered critical stakeholders and NGOs (see for 
example Fung et al 2007) by allowing them access to information they would not have had 
access to in a previous era. In many cases they are using this information against policy 
makers and regulators.  As Baroness O’Neil argues: 
 
“Transparency requirements can benefit expert ‘outsiders’ by enabling them to access 
information about the performance of institutions and their office holders. This is particularly 
helpful to expert critics of government, business, and professional performance.  Expert 
critics often have the time and ability to grasp and use information in ways that the wider 
public does not.  Transparency is therefore particularly useful to the media and to 
campaigning organisations which can discover information that bears on others’ 
performance (while they themselves are generally exempt from like transparency 
requirements).” (O’Neil 2006, p.88) 
 
In addition, regulators and policy makers must be able to respond to queries, concerns and 
attacks resulting from these new transparency initiatives, as ignoring them could lead to 
public and stakeholder distrust (Lofstedt 2010) and possibly unintended regulatory 
consequences.  In other words in this new era of transparency it is vital for the regulatory 
and policy bodies in question to have large and competent communications departments to 
handle these inquiries. 
 
2.5 How do policy makers view the new model?  
One could have expected that most regulators and policy makers would have been opposed 
to the various strands of the new model of regulation.  In the past regulators were attracted 
to the role, in many cases having turned down more lucrative jobs in the private sector, 
because of the power and prestige of the position (Kilpatrick et al. 1964).  Several studies 
have examined the motivation behind public sector pursuit and found that: “prestige is a 
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 factor that influences the attractiveness of public sector jobs” (Perry and Wise 1990).  As one 
Swedish policy maker noted: 
 
“I work on average 12 hours a day.  I am completely in love with the job I have, in 
particular the power that comes with it.  I would be loath to either give the public a role in 
deciding what I should be doing, or in effect to give power to an outside watchdog-type 
body because there were concerns about lack of trust in our profession.  In such a case 
I would prefer to get expert advice on how I could become a more competent and even 
a more powerful decision maker.” (Swedish policy maker January 2009). 
However, this Swedish policy maker appears to be in the minority.  Many regulators and 
policy makers do not appear to mind greater scrutiny.  As one official in the UK Food 
Standards Agency recently noted: 
 
“I do not mind having the board meetings web-streamed.  It means that we have to be 
better prepared and briefed as we realise the whole world is watching and if we are not 
careful we could be criticised by an outside body.” (UK FSA official July 2008) 
Overall in interviews and discussions we have had with regulators and policy makers 
throughout Europe, most appear comfortable with the tools of the new model of regulation.  
This is also supported by the literature which shows that government officials take the view 
that stakeholder engagement is necessary for regaining public trust and therefore should be 
encouraged as much as possible (UK Strategy Unit 2002; UK CoRWM 2006; Petts 2008). 
That said, in view of the political context of risk regulation, these same civil servants in our 
interviews recognised the reluctance of citizens to defer important decisions to institutional 
elites (see Laird 1989). As one civil servant noted: 
 
“I think if we saw ourselves as ‘stewards’ of some risks, on behalf of the public or the 
environment, we would adopt a different approach.  I guess this is strongly linked to 
trust, where the public’s reaction is often saying ‘I don’t trust you to steward my risk?”  
However, the new model of regulation not only has teething problems, but can also have 
serious unintended consequences.  Indeed, we argue that is it is rather naïve for regulators 
and policy makers, in many cases influenced by risk entrepreneurs who are actively 
promoting greater transparency and public involvement, to accept the new model of 
regulation more or less as a fait accompli.  In the next section we further examine risk 
regulation practices through a number of case studies, with a special interest in issues of 
transparency and risk communication, the behaviour of risk entrepreneurs, and regulatory 
responses to social amplification.   
 
3.  The case studies 
In recent years there have been a number of examples that are instructive with regard to the 
challenges pertaining to risk governance in the 21st century.  In this section we focus on 
three examples from the food and pharmaceutical fields, sectors that were particularly 
affected by regulatory scandals in the 1990s and the early part of this century (eg Angell 
2004; Lofstedt 2007;  Ratzan 1998).   
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 3.1 Avandia 
As a result of the regulatory crisis surrounding Cox-2s2  – in particular Vioxx – in the US, the 
public lost trust in the medical regulator the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Harris 
2007 and 2008; Lofstedt 2007; Niesi 2008).  The consequence of this public distrust has 
been the growth in the power of a number of risk entrepreneurs, most notably highly 
influential medical researchers such as Dr. Steven Nissen and Dr. Bruce Psaty, editors of 
leading medical journals (including the Lancet and New England Journal of Medicine), 
journalists at leading broadsheets (in particular the New York Times) and NGOs such as 
Public Citizen.  The Avandia case (see Lofstedt 2009 for a full discussion) is an example of 
how much power these risk entrepreneurs actually have and the possible consequences of 
this power. 
 
The drug Rosiglitazone, under the trademark Avandia, is a Type 2 diabetes drug 
manufactured by the UK-based pharmaceutical company Glaxo Smith Kline (GSK).  Avandia 
effectively lowers blood-sugar levels in type-2 diagnosed diabetics, thereby preventing long-
term complications of the disease.   High blood sugar affects nearly every part of the body 
and can cause blindness, kidney failure, heart attack and stroke.  The US FDA approved the 
use of Avandia to control blood-sugar levels in 1997 and until May 2007 it was being taken 
by two million people worldwide including a million Americans.  In May 2007, Nissen and 
Wolski published an article based on a meta analysis in the New England Journal of 
Medicine, which showed that of the 42 clinical trials analysed, diabetic patients taking 
Avandia experienced 43 per cent more heart attacks than those not taking the drug (Nissen 
and Wolski 2007).  Although the Nissen and Wolski article was not an “outlier”, as GSK and 
FDA unpublished meta analyses had shown trends in a similar direction (von Eschenbach 
2007), because the results were published in an article in a leading medical journal, they led 
to massive media coverage causing  a drop in GSK’s share price and a fall in Avandia 
prescriptions.  For example, between publication of the Nissen and Wolski article in May 
2007 and February 2008, when GSK posted its full year results, GSK’s share price fell from 
£14.64 to £10.78, with company executives blaming the Avandia scare for wiping off a billion 
dollars in profits over 2007 (Jack 2008).  
 
More problematically, the Avandia scare led many diabetics to halt their medical treatments.  
Prior to the NEJM article one million Avandia prescriptions were being written each month.  
By September 2007, Avandia prescriptions in the US had decreased by 60 per cent to 
436,000 a month.  In the same period, Avandia’s main competitor, a drug called Actos, only 
increased by an additional 100,000 prescriptions a month leaving almost 500,000 
prescriptions unaccounted for (Saul 2007).  During the entire six month episode, media 
headlines were dominated by Nissen and his other medical research colleagues as along 
with Congress, which had decided to investigate the case.  
 
There were a number of key trigger factors in the Avandia episode.  Firstly it is a widely-used 
diabetes drug, used by millions of patients on a daily basis.  Hence there is a “scale” issue.  
Regulators and the public are much more worried about products that can affect large 
 
                                            
2 Cox-2 inhibitors are part of a class of drugs that reduce pain inflammation as effectively as older medicines (so 
called non steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs-NSAIDS) but which lessen the risk of gastric bleeding. 
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 numbers of people (Burgess 2004).  Secondly, the initial meta analysis was carried out by a 
widely-respected and trusted neutral third party, lending credibility to the results (Slovic 
1993).  Thirdly, there was a political timing issue.  In 2007 the US Congress would conduct 
its five-yearly review of the FDA under the so-called PDUFA (Prescription Drug User Fee 
Act) Programme.  The review had a particularly strong focus on the post-marketing division 
as a number of reports, most notably those of the US Government Accountability Office (GA) 
and the Institute of Medicine (IOM), had advocated strengthening this division following high 
profile safety cases such as Vioxx (IOM 2006).  Fourthly, Nissen shared preliminary data 
with politicians who were in the middle of a Congressional investigation of the FDA.  In short 
there were a number of trigger factors that would ensure that any media story would be 
amplified (Kasperson et al 1988; Pidgeon et al 2003).  To make matters worse, politicians 
promoting reform of the FDA knew about the forthcoming Avandia article while the FDA was 
unaware of the study until the day it was published.   
 
Avandia is an example of how transparency (here in the form of clinical trial data) can further 
empower the risk entrepreneurs and cause an unintended regulatory consequence.  Since 
2004, leading medical journals including the New England Journal of Medicine have come to 
an agreement that they will no longer publish articles on clinical trials unless those carrying 
out the studies (in many cases big pharma) publicly register the tests on recognised 
websites (such as www.ClinicalTrials.gov).  In addition lawsuits have also forced big pharma 
to become more transparent.  For example, GSK put all its drug-trials data on a publicly-
available website in September 2004 after the settlement of a lawsuit regarding the 
antidepressant Paxil with the then New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer (Meier 2004).  
This increase in transparency in the pharmaceutical sector has strengthened the hand of risk 
entrepreneurs active in this area, as they have been able to accumulate information that was 
previously not available to them.  This is how Nissen and Wolski were able to complete their 
meta analysis on Avandia. 
 
3.2 Azo dyes 
Communicating risks and benefits in the UK in the post BSE era has never been easy.  The 
public has lost much of its trust in regulators (although there are signs that this may be 
increasing again (FSA 2009)) and as a result does not listen to or believe regulators. In 
many cases this has led to a policy vacuum which has been quickly filled by risk 
entrepreneurs.  This was seen, for example, with the 2005/06 aspartame controversy (see 
section 3.3 below) which received significantly more headlines in the UK than any other 
country apart from Italy (Lofstedt 2008), and with the 2007 scare regarding azo dyes, which 
involved campaigning academics, media journalists acting as lobbyists, and pressure 
groups.   The scare in effect started when the UK Food Standards Authority (FSA) 
commissioned Professor Jim Stevenson and his group at the University of Southampton to 
conduct a study to show whether there was a link between the consumption of six artificial 
colours and a preservative and hyperactivity in children (for a full review of this case study 
see Lofstedt 2009). This was in effect a follow up study of the Isle of Wight project which 
purported to show a link (Bateman et al 2004), but which was considered by the FSA’s 
scientific advisory body, the Committee of Toxicity (COT), to be fundamentally flawed in that 
the link was only witnessed by parents and not by independent observers (COT 2001).   
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 The Southampton study tested two different cocktails with a placebo on two groups of school 
children aged three and eight to nine.  The first cocktail used in the Southampton study was 
the same one used in the Isle of Wight study.  A second cocktail contained food colourings 
more in line with the ones presently available (and not containing tartrazine which had been 
phased out as a food colouring).  Researchers concluded that the children taking the first 
cocktail containing tartrazine were less well behaved than those taking a placebo, but there 
was less clarity with the second cocktail (ie that not containing tartrazine). The behaviour of 
the eight to nine year olds was significantly affected according to the statistical methodology 
used by the authors, while that of the three year olds was not (McCann et al 2007).   
 
The FSA received the final report from Professor Stevenson in February 2007 which was 
immediately sent out for independent peer review to the COT.  In May the same year, prior to 
publication, the Southampton study became front page news with the title in the Guardian 
newspaper: “New fears over additives in children’s food”.  A source at the University of 
Southampton leaked the results of the research, which validated the earlier Isle of Wight 
findings to the industry magazine The Grocer (Lawrence 2007).  Because of the leak and the 
media coverage it received, the FSA was forewarned that there would be significant media 
coverage once the Southampton article was published.   
 
The FSA’s outreach strategy before and after publication of the Southampton study 
(September 2007) was to take the communication initiative before it was seized by pressure 
groups so as not to unnecessarily alarm the public.  As a result, the FSA informed industry 
about the results of the article two days before the publication embargo (6th September), and 
on 5th September 2007 held a press conference at the FSA headquarters with Professor Jim 
Stevenson attending.  The initial stance of the FSA was to put forward a scientific message 
regarding the findings.  For example, the Chief Scientist, Dr. Andrew Wadge at the FSA 
noted: 
 
“We have revised our advice to consumers; if a child shows signs of hyperactivity or 
ADHD [Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder], then eliminating the colours used in the 
Southampton study from their diet might have some beneficial effects.  If parents are 
concerned about any additives they should remember that, by law, food additives must 
be listed on the label so they can make the choice to avoid the product if they want to.” 
(Wadge in Smithers 2007). 
 
The FSA’s guarded and more scientific response was immediately attacked by a number of 
risk entrepreneurs for not going far enough. They said that the food colourings used in the 
Southampton study should be legally banned.  The FSA said it could not unilaterally ban 
additives as the UK is part of the European Union, but sent the Southampton study to the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) for an expert opinion.  Terrence Collis, Director of 
Communications at the FSA, defended the decision and argued: 
“This is a proportionate response.  To ban all additives would scare many parents and 
let’s be clear, these additives are not poisoning children.” (Collis in Wallop 2007) 
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 Two vocal academic risk entrepeneurs found this stance unacceptable and tried to put 
pressure on the FSA by sending open letters to the board of the FSA asking it to implement 
a unilateral ban of the six colourings (e.g. Millstone and Lang 2007) but this was rejected by 
the board.   
 
The EFSA’s scientific opinion was published on 7th March 2008, noting that the Southampton 
study “provided limited evidence that the mixtures or additives tested had a small effect on 
the activity and attention of some children” (EFSA 2008), and concluding that the UK study 
could not be used as a basis for changing the acceptable daily intake (ADI) of the respective 
food colours and the preservative sodium benzoate.  The EFSA’s opinion was immediately 
attacked by risk enterpreneurs who said that it showed that the FSA did not properly design 
the Southampton research project (Poulter 2008). 
 
In September 2007 Dame Deidre Hutton, then chair of the FSA, promised to raise the 
Southampton study once again after the scientific opinion from the EFSA had been received.  
She kept this promise and the food additives and hyperactivity issue was re-tabled when the 
FSA board met on 10th April 2008. Just prior to the board meeting Stevenson and his 
colleagues at Southampton produced a rebuttal to the EFSA’s scientific opinion. This 
compared children’s exposures to azo dyes with the state of knowledge about lead and IQ in 
children evaluated in the early 1980s, noting that effect sizes between high and low lead 
groups were similar to the effect sizes obtained in their study of food additives and hence 
this was enough justification for immediate action (Stevenson et al 2008).  This rebuttal was 
socially amplified by the media (Kasperson et al 1988) and used by the new regulators to put 
pressure on the board to change their opinion.  At the board meeting following presentations 
from both the EFSA and COT, the FSA decided to push for a voluntary ban of the six dyes 
with Dame Hutton arguing: 
 
“If one puts consumers first, which is our duty, we must recognise that these colours are 
not necessary and it would be sensible to have them removed from all foods.” (Clarke 
2008). 
This revised stance by the FSA went against its own scientific evidence and that provided by 
the EFSA.  This new precautionary stance taken by the FSA was seen as a victory for the 
new regulators with Richard Watts of the campaign group Sustain arguing: 
“The FSA had little choice other than take this step as soon as they received evidence that 
these additives were about as harmful to children as leaded petrol.” (Clarke 2008) 
 
The outcome of this unilateral precautionary action, caused by the regulatory storm driven by 
risk entrepreneurs, aside from giving more power to the entrepreneurs themselves, is 
unclear. But it is likely that it will unnecessarily increase public concern regarding colourings, 
preservatives and dyes as previous research has shown that making decisions based on a 
precautionary basis can lead to more public concern about the product in question (Barnett 
et al 2006 and 2007; Wiedemann and Schutz 2005; Wiedemann et al 2007) rather than less. 
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 3.3 Aspartame 
The 2005/06 aspartame controversy is an example of a regulatory storm driven by a media-
savvy risk entrepreneur (Ramazzini) with significant economic consequences for the 
producers of the product (see Lofstedt 2008 for a detailed discussion). 
 
Aspartame is a high-intensity sweetener marketed under brands such as Equal, Nutrasweet 
and Canderel and has been added to dry food and soft drink products since the early 1980s.  
It was first discovered by the US-based chemical company G.D.Searle in 1965, but was not 
approved for use in foods until the early 1980s because of possible cancer-related concerns.  
Today aspartame remains a highly controversial sweetener, although peer-reviewed 
scientific studies to date indicate that aspartame is safe – that is no evidence for harm has 
been found – to consume as an artificial sweetener (e.g. European Commission 2002). 
 
In 2005, the European Foundation of Oncology and Environmental Sciences, more 
commonly referred to as the Ramazzini Foundation, published an initial study noting that 
aspartame causes cancer in rats.  The publication of the Ramazzini study took the world by 
storm as it was a scientific ‘outlier’, going against most of the previous studies in the area.   
 
Once Dr.Soffritti (the lead researcher involved) and his colleagues at the Foundation 
completed their initial research on the aspartame-cancer link, they implemented a multi-
pronged communication strategy.  Firstly, prior to the initial results being published in their 
own in-house journal, they gave a number of presentations regarding the results to 
regulators and universities in Europe and North America.  In July 2005 the Foundation held a 
press conference publicising the initial findings, which had now been published in its in-
house journal, the European Journal of Oncology.  The paper with “in press” was made 
available on the day of the press conference and was published on Ramazzini’s website.  
The press release, and a statement by the International Sweeteners Association (ISA) 
challenging the findings, was picked up by the Italian National Press Agency (ANSA) and 
rapidly spread across the continent.  Key articles appeared in the UK press including BBC 
News Online, the Daily Mail, the Daily Express and the Guardian newspapers, referring to 
the press release and ISA statement with headlines such as the Daily Mail’s “Sweeteners 
link to cancer denied” and the Guardian’s “Fresh fears raised about aspartame: 
manufacturers dispute study into lab rats sweetener.” And the controversy did not end with 
the press conference.  In September 2005 Ramazzini researchers once again presented 
their results, this time at their own scientific conference in Bologna entitled “Framing the 
Future in Light of the Past: Living in a chemical world” which was attended by academics 
from Europe and North America.  And on 17th November 2005 the Foundation issued a press 
release announcing that its latest paper on the aspartame-cancer link had been published 
online in the peer-reviewed journal Environmental Health Perspectives.  
 
Meanwhile, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was urgently trying to begin its risk 
assessment on aspartame using primary data from the Ramazzini Foundation.  The EFSA 
initially requested this information in June 2005 following publication of the data in the 
European Journal of Oncology, and Herman Koeter (then acting director of EFSA) requested 
it again when he attended the institute’s September 2005 symposium, but no data was 
forthcoming.  To put more pressure on the Foundation, the EFSA issued an unprecedented 
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 press release on 29th November 2005 urging the institute to send the Authority this data 
(EFSA 2005a).   On 15th December 2005 the Foundation sent both the Italian Ministry of 
Health and the EFSA a 900-page report with some of the data.  On 19th December the EFSA 
acknowledged that the data had been received and that it would begin its scientific risk 
assessment (EFSA 2005b).  Crucially, however, the report did not contain any of the 34,000 
slides that the institute had made and on which key results of the study were based.  When 
Koeter and scientists across the world asked for this data from Ramazzini the official 
response was: 
 
“…we do not think it is appropriate for slides to be reviewed on data that has already been 
published.  It’s 34,000 slides and eight years work.  Dr.Soffritti is not open to a third party 
reading a small subset of slides and issuing an opinion on the study.” (Kathy Knowles, 
quoted in Lovett 2006). 
 
In mid December 2005 the controversy took on a political dimension.  The UK Liberal MP 
Roger Williams held an adjournment debate in the House of Commons on aspartame 
concluding that the substance should be banned just like the red food dye Sudan 1. He cited 
the Ramazzini Foundation’s study as the new “monumental” study that should have “set 
alarm bells ringing in health departments around the world.” (Williams 2005) and claimed:  
 
“There is compelling and reliable evidence for this carcinogenic substance to be banned 
from the UK food and drinks market” (Williams 2005). 
The then Public Health Minister Caroline Flint responded in the House of Commons by 
saying that she took the issue very seriously and would look at the new data, but noted that 
the UK expert Committee on Toxicity (COT) had reviewed the Ramazzini Foundation’s 
research on aspartame and had not been convinced by its interpretations (Flint 2005). 
 
The adjournment debate led to media amplification in the UK press.  The front page of the 
Daily Express, for example, had the headline “Cancer is linked to sweetener – Risk in 6000 
food and drink products” and quoted Williams and the Italian (Ramazzini) study.  On page 7 
of the Guardian on the same day the headline ran: “Safety of artificial sweetener called into 
question by MP”.  These strongly worded headlines led to public concern as to whether 
aspartame should be consumed as a sweetener. 
 
From November 2005 to May 2006 Ramazzini’s two papers were in the public domain, but 
journalists, scientists and other stakeholders were waiting for the EFSA’s opinion on the 
research.  Newspaper articles were written on the Ramazzini findings without the EFSA 
being able to comment on them.  However, at the end of April 2006 the EFSA’s analysis was 
complete and on 5th May 2006, it held a press conference with a webcast in Rome 
summarising its scientific opinion of the aspartame report and put a lengthy opinion on the 
EFSA website.  The EFSA panel concluded that a number of cancers were irrelevant (kidney, 
ureter and bladder) as they were specific to rats and not to humans; and the increase in 
cancers were unrelated to the aspartame treatment.  The panel concluded that based on all 
of the available data to date there was no reason to “further review the previous scientific 
opinion on the safety of aspartame…”  
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 The EFSA press conference received significant press coverage – for example a headline in 
the Daily Mail ran:  “Sweetener cleared from cancer link” – but by this time, the damage had 
already been done.  The Ramazzini articles had led to a 40% fall in the consumption of 
table-top aspartame in countries like France, which continue to the present day.        
           
4. Recommendations 
These three case studies appear to show that the new model of regulation may have 
teething problems that can lead to detrimental effects for society, be it patient safety, 
unnecessary market restrictions and economic losses, or more risky replacement products.  
That said, in this post-trust era it will be difficult to move back to the consensual style of 
regulation even though some policy makers would clearly welcome this (e.g. Taverne 2005).  
Rather what is needed now is for regulators and policy makers to benefit from some of the 
theoretical insights that can be derived from decades of risk research.  In this final section 
we put forward some suggestions which regulators and policy makers may wish to consider. 
 
4.1 Improving risk communication capacity and competences 
Distrusted regulators and policy makers are generally poor communicators of risk. Firstly, 
they are often too slow to communicate, in more cases than not being held back by the vast 
bureaucratic machinery that makes up most government departments.  By being slow in 
their communication strategy officials spend more time fire-fighting and engaging in reactive 
risk communication.  The problem with this is that reactive risk communication destroys 
public trust whereas proactive risk communication gains public trust (Fischhoff 1995; NRC 
1989 and 1996). In contrast, many new regulators or risk entrepreneurs are ‘well-oiled’ 
public relations machines that excel in courting media attention and framing public opinion, 
debate and controversy, and by being fast and nimble they can consistently engage in 
proactive risk communication attuned to the demands of a 24-hour news cycle.   
 
Secondly, the same government officials need to improve their communication skills and 
understanding. Risk communication failures can typically occur either from a narrow 
appreciation of the risk communication problem at hand, or from an inability to execute 
responsive risk communication competently and efficiently once a problem has been 
recognised (Fischhoff 1995). Many officials have not been trained in communication skills 
and often find it difficult to put over the clear and concise messages needed for the modern 
media. This problem is not helped by an over reliance on public relations consultants  who 
tend to have only a surface understanding of the nuanced workings of risk-communication 
processes in advanced liberal democracies. This can hinder the ability of officials to 
appropriately match communication strategies to the context of communication problems, 
which can vary according to both the characteristics of the risk and the social dynamics of 
the situation at hand (Klinke and Renn 2004; Lofstedt 2005; Wardman 2008). To address this 
problem, regulators and policy makers could be encouraged to attend risk communication 
courses for continuing professionals such as the one that is given every summer at Harvard 
University.   
 
4.2  Understand the limits of transparency 
Although transparency has been widely promoted as the key tool to regain public trust 
(European Commission 2001; UK Strategy Unit 2002), policy makers and regulators need to 
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 realise that transparency is not problem free (O’Neil 2006).  Was it in society’s interest, for 
example, to put all the clinical trials associated with Avandia on a publicly-available website?  
It is true that there should be some form of proper policing of clinical studies so that not only 
the positive ones get published (e.g. Niesi 2008), but complete transparency may be a step 
too far. More than 500,000 American Avandia patients stopped taking the drug as a result of 
the 2007 New England Journal of Medicine publication.  As Steven Galson, the previous 
director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) at the FDA argued: 
 
“I would be very concerned about the wholesale posting of thousands of clinical trials 
leading to mass confusion.” (Galson in Meier 2007) 
This is something that Senator Davis of Virginia agrees with: 
 
“People get very confused when this stuff gets out in the media and it gets very 
unfiltered.” (Davis 2007, p.52) 
In addition as noted previously, transparency benefits the sophisticated new regulators more 
than the public itself, and regulators and policy makers should now debate what the right 
level of transparency is:  What is the balance between what is needed to gain public trust in 
the policy-making process and what will weaken regulators and policy makers still further 
and arguably lead to greater public distrust?  
 
4.3  Media guidelines 
Citizens are not stupid and there is no need to “educate” them in the fashion that many 
policy makers seem to believe (Taverne 2005).  Rather many public outcries or alarms that 
are prevalent in today’s world are perpetuated by undue media attention and amplification of 
risks which could be better and more responsibly communicated. This is exemplified by the 
mishandling of the Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR) vaccine scare in the UK (Goldacre 
2008; Horton 2004), the communication of the Y2k or the Millenium computer bug (Davies 
2008) and other scientific uncertainties (Friedman et al 1999). Effective media risk 
communication in such cases is often undermined by poor handling of science which can, for 
example, result from impatience. As the former CEO of GSK Jean-Pierre Garnier notes: 
 
“My wish for media is to be more sophisticated when they report scientific news.  
Debates now are being thrown into the public domain before scientists have given their 
opinion.” (Quoted in Barriaux 2008, p.31) 
On the other hand when scientists are consulted they are often pitted against each other, or 
against impassioned citizens and campaign activists in the name of proportionality, 
regardless of their scientific credentials. This leads to scientific pluralism (Jasanoff 1997) and 
in many cases either a confused public (Is farmed salmon safe to eat?) or further distrust of 
science (for an example concerning acrylamide see Lofstedt 2003). One way of addressing 
poor communication would be through the development of reporting guidelines, similar to 
those agreed by the BBC in 2003 (Harrabin et al 2003), that would help journalists to 
become more attuned to communication pitfalls (for a discussion see Lofstedt 2009b). More 
science-media forums to encourage greater critical dialogue between scientists and 
journalists, such as those promoted by the European Science Forum, could also be used.  
Had media guidelines been in place and implemented by print and broadcast journalists at 
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 the time of the azo dyes and Avandia controversies, it is less likely that these would have led 
to regulatory storms.   
 
4.4  Constructive deliberation 
As part of a democratic society public deliberation is healthy and should be encouraged 
(Barber 1984; Renn et al 1995).  But it does not offer a panacea and could be better targeted 
and better used by policy makers and regulators.  One tool that could be promoted is the 
International Risk Governance Council’s risk governance model (IRGC 2005) which calls for 
the inclusion of social context, recognising that the public, stakeholders, and regulators 
perceive risks differently (e.g.Slovic 1987 and 2000) and that such differences in risk 
perceptions are not reducible to a ‘knowledge deficit’ on the part of non-experts (Irwin and 
Wynne 1996; Wynne 1989, 1996).  With the categorisation of risk-related knowledge, the 
IRGC framework recognises that not all risks are the same.  Some are better understood 
than others: potential negative consequences are obvious, applied values are non-
controversial and uncertainties can be captured in probability distributions.  Other risks are 
inherently uncertain, complex and or ambiguous.  These risks should be treated differently 
and should involve pubic deliberation at some times but not at others (IRGC 2005; Renn and 
Walker 2008).   
   
4.5 Scientific peer review of risk assessments used for regulations 
One possible way of promoting higher quality science-based decision making in this era of 
unintended regulatory consequences would be to help ensure that the risk assessments and 
other underlying scientific arguments used as the foundations for many regulations in the 
health and environment spheres are based on some form of external scientific peer review.  
Such a peer review could be based on the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 2006 somewhat controversial Risk 
Assessment Bulletin that had as an objective to: 
“enhance the technical quality and objectivity of risk assessments prepared by federal 
agencies.” (OIRA 2006) 
 
The then Administrator of the OIRA, Professor John Graham, was concerned about the 
varying quality of the risk assessments used in the development of regulations and felt that 
by having a peer review system in place, the overall practice of risk assessment could be 
improved.  The US National Academy of Sciences, which was asked to review the proposed 
bulletin, had a number of concerns, most notably that a set of principles rather than legally 
binding guidance should be put forward in order to ensure de-facto control of the Agency’s 
risk assessments by the White House Office of the President (US NRC 2007). But the idea 
may be worth introducing to Europe, as long as risk assessment guidelines are developed in 
tandem with a number of key regulatory agencies in order for them to have some ownership 
of the project and are not merely dictated to by a central oversight authority.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper has provided some insights into the challenges of risk governance in the post-
trust era, demonstrating that there are no simple formulas to resolve the teething problems 
of the new model of regulation.  In particular the emergence of this new model marks a 
battleground between risk entrepreneurs on the one hand and distrusted official authorities 
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 on the other.  At present the risk entrepreneurs have increased their influence due in no 
small part to their superior communications skills. However, as highlighted by the cases 
above, citizens have not always been the benefactors of this increased influence. If official 
authorities are to counteract these trends for the better they need to become more 
competent communicators of risk and encourage the development of media guidelines and 
constructive deliberation. This paper can be seen as an effort to outline a number of areas 
for improvement that policy makers and regulators may want to address in the future. 
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